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Abstract
Representations are internal models of the environment that can provide guidance to a
behaving agent, even in the absence of sensory information. It is not clear how rep-
resentations are developed and whether or not they are necessary or even essential for
intelligent behavior. We argue here that the ability to represent relevant features of the
environment is the expected consequence of an adaptive process, give a formal defini-
tion of representation based on information theory, and quantify it with a measure R.
To measure how R changes over time, we evolve two types of networks—an artificial
neural network and a network of hidden Markov gates—to solve a categorization task
using a genetic algorithm. We find that the capacity to represent increases during evo-
lutionary adaptation, and that agents form representations of their environment during
their lifetime. This ability allows the agents to act on sensorial inputs in the context
of their acquired representations and enables complex and context-dependent behavior.
We examine which concepts (features of the environment) our networks are represent-
ing, how the representations are logically encoded in the networks, and how they form
as an agent behaves to solve a task. We conclude that R should be able to quantify
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the representations within any cognitive system, and should be predictive of an agent’s
long-term adaptive success.
1 Introduction
The notion of representation is as old as cognitive science itself (see, e.g., Chomsky,
1965; Newell and Simon, 1972; Fodor, 1975; Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977; Marr,
1982; Pinker, 1989; Pitt, 2008), but its usefulness for Artificial Intelligence (AI) re-
search has been doubted (Brooks, 1991). In his widely cited article “Intelligence with-
out representation”, Brooks argued instead for a subsumption architecture where the
autonomous behavior producing components (or layers) of the cognitive system di-
rectly interface with the world and with each other rather than with a central symbol
processor dealing in explicit representations of the environment. In particular, inspired
by the biological path to intelligence, Brooks argued that AI research needs to be rooted
in mobile autonomous robotics and a direct interaction between action and perception.
Echoing Moravec (1984), he asserted that the necessary elements for the development
of intelligence are mobility, acute vision, and the ability to behave appropriately in a dy-
namic environment (Brooks, 1991). This architecture achieved insect-level intelligence
and Brooks argued that a path to higher level AI could be forged by incrementally in-
creasing the complexity of subsumption architecture.
However, 20 years after advocating such a radical departure from the classical ap-
proach to AI, the subsumption approach seems to have stalled as well. We believe that
the reason for the lack of progress does not lie in the attempt to base AI research in
mobile autonomous robots, but that instead representations (also sometimes called “in-
ternal models”, (Craik, 1943; Wolpert et al., 1995; Kawato, 1999)) are key to complex
adaptive behavior. Indeed, while representation-free robotics has made some impor-
tant strides (Nolfi, 2002), it is limited to problems that are not “representation hun-
gry” (Clark, 1997), i.e., problems that do not require past information or additional
(external) knowledge about the current context. In addition, the technical difficulty
of developing a subsumption architecture increases with the number of layers or sub-
systems. This problem of subsumption architecture mirrors the difficulties of classic
representational AI approaches to build accurate and appropriate models of the world.
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An alternative approach to engineering cognitive architectures and internal models
is evolutionary robotics (Nolfi and Floreano, 2000). Instead of designing the structure
or functions of a control architecture, principles of Darwinian evolution are used to
create complex networks that interface perception and action in non-obvious and of-
ten surprising ways. Such structures can give rise to complex representations of the
environment that are hard to engineer and equally hard to analyze (see, e.g. Floreano
and Mondada,1996). Evolved representations provide context, are flexible, and can be
readjusted given new stimuli that contradict the current assumptions. Representations
can be updated during the lifetime or over the course of evolution and thus are able to
handle even new sensory input (Bongard et al., 2006). We argue that as robots evolve
to behave appropriately (and survive) in a dynamic and noisy world, representations
of the environment emerge within the cognitive apparatus, and are integrated with the
perceived sensory data to create intelligent behavior–using not only the current state of
the environment but crucially taking into account historical data (memory) as well.
To test this hypothesis and make internal representations of evolved systems accessi-
ble to analysis, we propose a new information-theoretic measure of the degree to which
an embodied agent represents its environment within its internal states and show how
the capacity to represent environmental features emerges over thousands of generations
of simulated evolution. The main idea is that representations encode environmental fea-
tures because of their relevance for the cognitive system in question (Clark and Toribio,
1994). Hence, for our purposes, representations can be symbolic or sub-symbolic (e.g.,
neural states) as long as they have a physical basis, i.e., as long as they are encoded
in measurable internal states. However, we distinguish representations from sensorial
input because sensor inputs cannot provide the same past or external context as inter-
nal states. We thus explicitly define representations as that information about relevant
features of the environment which is encoded in the internal states of an organism and
which goes beyond the information present in its sensors (Haugeland, 1991; Clark,
1997). In particular, this implies that representations can, at time, misrepresent (Hauge-
land, 1991)–unlike information present in sensors, which always truthfully correlates
with the environment. To illuminate the functioning of evolved cognitive systems, we
show how it is in principle possible to determine what a representation is about, and
how representations form during the lifetime of an agent. We argue that our measure
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provides a valuable tool to investigate the organization of evolved cognitive systems
especially in cases where internal representations are “epistemically opaque”.
2 Methods
2.1 Information-theoretic measure of representation
Information theory has been used previously to quantify how context can modulate de-
cisions based on sensory input (Phillipps et al., 1994; Phillips and Singer, 1997; Kay
and Phillips, 2011). Here, we present an information-theoretic construction that explic-
itly takes the entropy of environmental states into account. To quantify representation,
we first define the relationship between the representing system and the represented en-
vironment in terms of information (shared, or mutual, entropy). Information measures
the correlation between two random variables, while the entropy H is a measure of the
uncertainty we have about a random variable in the absence of information (uncertainty
is therefore potential information). For a random variable X that can take on the states
xi with probabilities p(xi) = P (X = xi), the entropy is given by (Shannon, 1948):
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
p(xi) log p(xi) , (1)
where N is the number of possible states that X can take on.
The information between two random variables characterizes how much the degree
of order in one of the variables is predictive of the regularity in the other variable. It
can be defined using entropy as the difference between the sum of the entropies of two
random variablesX and Y [written asH(X) andH(Y )] and the joint entropy ofX and
Y , written as H(X, Y ):
I(X : Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ) =
∑
xy
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
. (2)
In Eq. (2), p(x) and p(y) are the probability distributions for the random variables X
and Y respectively [that is, p(x) = P (X = x)], while p(x, y) is the joint probability
distribution of the (joint) random variable XY . The shared entropy I(X : Y ) can also
be written in terms of a difference between unconditional and conditional entropies, as
I(X : Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) . (3)
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This definition reminds us that information is that which reduces our uncertainty about
a system. In other words, it is that which allows us to make predictions about a system
with an accuracy that is higher than when we did not have that information. In Eq. (3),
we introduced the concept of a conditional entropy (Shannon, 1948). For example,
H(X|Y ) (read as “H of X given Y ”) is the entropy of X when the state of the variable
Y is known, and is calculated as
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
xy
p(x, y) log p(x|y) , (4)
using the conditional probability p(x|y) = p(x, y)/p(y).
In general, information is able to detect arbitrary correlations between signals or
sets of events. We assume here that such correlations instantiate semiotic or informa-
tion relationships between a representing and represented, and use mutual information
to measure the correlation between a network’s internal states and its environment [see
also Marstaller et al. (2010)]. So, for example, we could imagine that X stands for the
states of an environment, whereas Y is a variable that represents those states of the en-
vironment. We need to be careful, however, to exclude from possible representational
variables those that are mere images of the environment, such as the trace that the world
leaves in an agent’s sensors. Indeed, mere correlations between internal states and the
environment are not sufficient to be treated as representational because they could be
due to behavior that is entirely reactive (Clark, 1997). Haugeland, for example, under-
stands representation as something that “stands in” for something in the environment,
but that is no longer reflected in the perceptual system of the agent (Haugeland, 1991).
Indeed, representation should be different from a mere translation: Consider a digital
camera’s relationship with its environment. The photo chip guarantees a one-to-one
mapping between the environment structure and the camera’s state patterns. But a
camera is not able to adapt to its environment. By taking a picture, the camera has
not ‘learned’ anything about its environment that will affect its future state. It simply
stores what it received through its inputs without extracting information from it, i.e., the
camera’s internal states are fully determined by its sensor inputs. Representation goes
beyond mere translation because the content, i.e. which feature of the environment is
represented, depends on the goals of the system. Not everything is represented in the
same way. A camera does not have this functional specification of its internal states.
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To rule out trivial representations like a camera’s internal states, we define represen-
tation as the shared entropy between environment states and internal states, but given
the sensor states, i.e., conditioned on the sensors. Thus, representation is that part of the
shared entropy between environment states and internal states that goes beyond what is
seen in the sensors (see Fig. 1). For the following, we take E, given by its probabil-
ity distribution p(ei) = P (E = ei), as the random variable to describe environmental
states, while S describes sensor states. If the internal states of the agent (hidden and
output states) are characterized by the random variable M with probability distribution
p(mj) = P (M = mj), then we define the representation R as (for an earlier version,
see Marstaller et al.,2010):
R = H(E : M |S) = I(E : M)− I(E : M : S) = Hcorr − I(S : E)− I(S : M) , (5)
where the correlation entropy Hcorr of the three variables E, S, and M [also called “to-
tal correlation” (Watanabe, 1960) or “multi-information” (McGill, 1954; Schneidman
et al., 2003)] is the amount of information they all three share:
Hcorr = H(E) +H(M) +H(S)−H(E,M, S) . (6)
In Eq. (5), we introduced the shared conditional entropy between three variables that is
defined as the difference between an information that is unshared and one that is shared
(with a third system), just as H(X|Y ) = H(X) − I(X : Y ), from Eq. (4). Thus, the
representationR of the worldE within internal statesM is the total correlation between
the three, but without what is reflected in S about E and M , respectively [measured by
I(S : E) and I(S : M)]. The relationship between R and the entropies of the three
variables S, E, and M is most conveniently summarized by an entropy Venn diagram,
as in Fig. 1. In these diagrams, a circle is a quantitative measure of the entropy of the
associated variable, and the shared entropy between two variables is represented by the
intersection of the variables, and so on (see, e.g., Cover and Thomas,1991).
Our information-theoretic definition of representation carries over from discrete
variables to continuous variables unchanged, as can be seen as follows. Let XE , XM ,
and XS be random variables defined with normalized probability density functions
fE(e), fM(m), and fS(s). The differential entropy h(X) (Cover and Thomas, 1991),
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defined as
h(X) = −
∫
S
f(x) log f(x)dx (7)
where S is the support of random variable X , is related to the discretized version
H(X∆) by noting that
H(X∆) + log ∆→ h(X) (∆→ 0) , (8)
where we introduced the discretization
pi =
∫ (i+1)∆
i∆
f(x)dx (9)
in order to define the discretized Shannon entropy H(X∆) = −∑i pi log pi. This
implies that an n-bit quantization of a continuous random variable is approximately
H(X) ≈ h(X) + n (Cover and Thomas, 1991). Let us now assume that the variables
XE , XM , and XS are each quantized by nE , nM , and nS bits respectively. Because
H(E,M, S) is then quantized by nE + nM + nS bits, it follows that Hcorr ≈ hcorr, that
is, the continuous and discrete variable correlation entropies are (in the limit of suffi-
ciently small ∆) approximately the same because the discretization correction cancels.
The same is true for the informations I(S : E) and I(S : M), as these are correlation
entropies between two variables. Thus, H(E : M |S) ≈ h(XE : XM |XS), the differ-
ential entropy version of R. We stress that while an exact identity between discrete and
continuous variable definitions of R is only ensured in the limit of vanishing discretiza-
tion, the cancellation of the correction terms log ∆ implies that the discrete version is
not biased with respect to the continuous version.
R defines a relation between a network’s activity patterns and its environment as
the result of information processing. R yields a positive quantity, measured in bits (if
logarithms are taken to base 2). In order to show that this measure of representation
reflects functional purpose (Clark, 1997), we evolve cognitive systems (networks) that
control the behavior of an embodied agent, and show that fitness, a measure for the
agent’s functional prowess, is correlated withR. In other words, we show that when the
environment (and task) is complex enough, agents react to this challenge by evolving
representations of that environment.
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I(E : M : S)
I(S : M |E)I(E : S|M)
H(S|E,M)
H(M |E,S)H(E|S,M)
Figure 1: Venn diagram of entropies and informations for the three random variable E,
S, and M , describing the states of the environment, sensors, and agent internal degrees
of freedom. The representation R = H(E : M |S) is shaded.
2.2 Evolution of Active Categorical Perception
We study the evolution of an agent that solves an active categorical perception (ACP)
task (Beer, 1996, 2003), but with modifications suggested by van Dartel et al. (2005)
(see also van Dartel M.F.,2005). Categorization is thought to be one of the key elements
in cognition (see Harnad 1987; Cohen and Lefebvre 2005). In categorical perception,
an agent has to partition objects in the world into different discrete categories based
on their visual appearance. In active categorical perception, the agent takes an active
role in which aspects of the object to view, that is, perception is intimately linked with
action. Whether or not this task requires internal representations may depend on the
specific nature of the task, and it is in general not simple to determine whether the agent
uses internal states to represent the environment, and in particular which features of
the world are represented by which computational units (Beer, 2003; Ward and Ward,
2009). In the task studied by Beer (1996; 2003), the agent has to discriminate between
circles and diamonds that were falling vertically towards the agent, who could move
laterally to change its perception of the object. In the version we study here, the agent
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Figure 2: A: In the simulation, large or small blocks fall diagonally towards the bottom
row of a 20×20 world, with the agent on the bottom row. For the purpose of illustrating
the task, a large brick (to be avoided) is falling to the left, while a small brick (to be
caught) is falling to the right. In simulations, only one block is falling at the time, and
both small and large bricks can fall either to the left or to the right. B: A depiction of the
agent’s neurons (bottom left: triangles depict sensors, circles illustrate brain neurons,
trapezoids denote actuators) and the sequence of activity patterns on the agent’s 4-bit
retina (right), as a large brick falls to the right.
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has to discriminate between large and small blocks, by catching the small blocks while
avoiding the large ones. In order to create visual ambiguity, the agent’s four upward-
looking sensors have a blind spot (two non-sensing units) between them. Furthermore,
blocks are falling diagonally (from left to right or right to left), so that the agent not
only has to categorize, but also to predict (see Fig. 2A).
We evolve active categorical perception in two experiments, using two different
control architectures. One is an artificial neural network (ANN), and one is a Markov
network, specifically, a network of Hidden Markov Gates (HMGs) (Edlund et al., 2011),
described in more detail in section 2.3. The agent is located at the bottom row of a
20× 20 world with periodic boundary conditions, and is able to move horizontally one
unit per time step (see Fig. 2A). Note that compared to van Dartel et al. (2005) we
doubled the vertical size of the arena in order to give the agent more time to assess
the direction of the falling block. The agent has four upward-looking sensors. The
state of a sensor is si = +1 when a block is detected, and si = 0 if no block is seen.
The arrangement of the agent’s sensors does not allow it to unambiguously identify the
falling block from three out of eight possible input states (counting the input where no
sensors are active). Only the input states S = (s0, s1, s2, s3) = (0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0),
and (0, 0, 1, 0) are unambiguous. The first classifies a large block that is positioned right
above the agent so that the second and the third sensor are in state s1 = s2 = 1 while the
remaining two units of the block are positioned above the two non-sensing units. The
other two patterns identify similarly positioned small blocks. All other five input states
can be created by either a small block, a big block, or no block at all (see Fig. 2B). At
each trial, a block of either small (two units) or large size (four units) falls from top to
bottom in 20 time steps. The blocks move continuously downwards and sideways one
unit per time step. Blocks either always move to the right or to the left. An object is
caught if the position of the block’s units and of the agent’s units at time step 20 overlap
in at least one unit.
For the information-theoretic characterization of correlations, we have to assign
probabilities to the possible states of the world. Theoretically, a falling block can be in
any of 20 different starting positions, large or small, and falling left or right, giving rise
to 80 possible experimental initial conditions. While the agent can be in any of 20 initial
positions, the periodic boundary conditions ensure that each of them is equivalent, given
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the 20 initial positions of the falling block. Because there are 20 time steps before
the block reaches the bottom row, there are in total 1,600 possible different states the
world can be in. We do not expect that all of these states will be discriminated by
the agent, so instead we introduce a coarse-graining of the world by introducing four
bits that we believe capture salient aspects of the world. We define the environmental
(joint) variable E = E0E1E2E3 to take on states as defined in Table 1. Of course, this
World state World character
E0 = 0 no sensor activated
E0 = 1 at least one sensor activated
E1 = 0 block is to the left of agent
E1 = 1 block is to the right of agent
E2 = 0 block is two units (small)
E2 = 1 block is four units (large)
E3 = 0 block is moving left
E3 = 1 block is moving right
Table 1: Coarse-graining of world states into the four bits E0, E1, E2, E3. Note that
E1 could be ambiguous in case the block is centered over the agent or exactly 10 units
away. We resolve this ambiguity by setting E1 = 0 when the block is centered over the
agent, and E1 = 1 when it is exactly 10 units away.
encoding reveals a bias in what we, the experimenters, believe are salient states of the
world, and certainly underestimates the amount of “discoverable” entropy. However, in
hindsight this coarse-graining appears to be sufficient to capture the essential variations
in the world, and furthermore lends itself to study which aspects of the world are being
represented within the agent’s network controller, by defining representations about
different aspects i of the world as the representation Ri = H(Ei : M |S). Thus, we will
study the four representations
Rhit = H(E0 : M |S) (10)
RLR = H(E1 : M |S) (11)
R4/2 = H(E2 : M |S) (12)
R+/− = H(E3 : M |S) (13)
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that represent whether the sensor has been activated [Eq. (10)], whether the block is
to the left or the right of the agent [Eq. (11)], if the block is large (size 4) or small
(size 2) [Eq. (12)], or whether the block is moving to the left or right [Eq. (13)]. We
can also measure how much (measured in bits) of each binary concept is represented in
any particular variable. For example, RLR(node 12) = H(E1 : M12|S) measures how
much of the “block is to my left or to my right” concept is encoded in variable 12.
2.3 Two Architectures for Cognitive Systems
The agent is controlled by a cognitive system, composed of computational units (loosely
referred to as “neurons” from here on) that map sensor inputs into motor outputs. The
cognitive system also has neurons that are internal (a hidden layer), which are those
neurons that are not part of the input or of the output layer. We further define sensor
neurons as those neurons that directly process the input (the input layer) and we de-
fine output neurons as those units that do not map to other units in the network or to
themselves (the output layer).
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) with evolvable topology. In our first experiment,
the robot’s movements are controlled by an artificial neural network that consists of 16
nodes: four input units (one for each sensor), two output units, and ten hidden units. The
states of the input units are discrete with values [+1,−1] specifying whether an object
is detected or not. The states of the output units (or actuators) are discrete with integer
values A = a ∈ [0, 1] encoding one of three possible actions: move one unit to the right
or left, or do not move (A1A2 = 00 : stand still, A1A2 = 01 : move right, A1A2 = 10 :
move left, A1A2 = 11 : stand still. While the hidden units’ states mi are continuous
with values [−1.0, 1.0], when evaluating these states to calculate R we discretize them
to binary (values below 0.0 become 0, every other value becomes 1). As discussed
earlier, this discretization does not introduce a bias in the value of R.
Usually, classic artificial neuronal networks have a fixed topology, i.e., one or more
layers and their connections are defined and associated with a weight. In a previous
experiment, we found that such fixed topologies lead to approximately constant R even
as the fitness of the agent increases (data not shown). One way to increase the complex-
ity of the network and the information it represents is to evolve a network’s topology
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as well as the connection weights. We make the network topology evolvable beyond
searching the connection weights by using neuronal gates (NG). A NG can arbitrarily
connect nodes of any type (input, hidden, and output nodes) without the fixed layered
topology of classic ANNs. Each connection is associated with a certain weight. A NG
calculates the sum of the values from a set of incoming nodesm(k)j via gate k, multiplied
by the associated weight w(k)j and applies a sigmoid function to calculate its output m
m(t+ 1) = tanh
(
n∑
k=1
∑
j=1
w
(k)
j m
(k)
j (t)
)
, (14)
where the sum over j runs over all the neurons that feed into gate k. This value m is
then propagated to every node this NG is connected to.
To apply a Genetic Algorithm to this system, each ANN is encoded in a genome as
follows: A start codon of two loci mark the beginning of a NG, the subsequent two loci
encode the NG’s number of inputs and outputs, while two further loci specify the origin
of the inputs (which neurons feed into the gate) and the outputs (where the NG writes
into). This information is then followed by an encoding of the n weights of an n-input
NG (see Fig. 3). The number of gates in the network can change as it evolves, and is
only determined by the number of start codons in the genome. The genomes encoding
these ANNs can undergo the same mutational changes as described later in the MB
section. In this respect, evolving open-topology ANNs is similar to using evolutionary
algorithms (such as NEAT, see, e.g., Stanley and Miikkulainen (2002)) to evolve neural
networks with augmented topology.
Markov Brains (MB). In our second experiment, the agent is controlled by a network
of 16 nodes (four input, two output, and ten internal nodes, i.e., with the same types and
number of nodes as the ANNs) which are connected via Hidden Markov Gates (HMGs,
see Edlund et al. 2011). Networks of HMGs (Markov brains or MBs for short) are a
type of stochastic Markov network (see, e.g., Koller and Friedman 2009) and are re-
lated to the hierarchical temporal memory model of neocortical function (Hawkins and
Blakeslee, 2004; George and Hawkins, 2005, 2009) and the HMAX algorithm (Riesen-
huber and Poggio, 1999), except that Markov brains need not be organized in a strictly
hierarchical manner as their connectivity is evolved rather than designed top-down.
Each HMG can be understood as a finite-state machine that is defined by its in-
13
tneuronal
gate 1
neuronal
gate 2
W1 W2 W3 W4 W1 W2 W3 W4
∑t+1
in hidden out
Figure 3: Open-topology Artificial Neural Network, with four input neurons (orange),
ten hidden neurons (blue), and two motor neurons (green). The nodes are connected
via two neuronal gates (NG). Each NG connects four arbitrary input nodes with weight
W to four output nodes. This figure illustrates how the nodes become updated from
time point t to t + 1. When two NGs write into the same node, their outputs are added
(indicated by
∑
) before the sigmoid function is applied.
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put/output structure (Fig. 4A) and a state transition table (Fig. 4B). All nodes in Markov
brains are binary, and in principle the HMGs are stochastic, that is, the output nodes fire
(that is, are set to state ‘1’) with a probability determined by the state-to-state transition
table. Here, each HMG can receive up to four inputs, and distribute signals to up to
4 nodes, with a minimum of one input and one output node (these settings are config-
urable). For the evolution of the ACP task, we consider only deterministic HMGs (each
row of the transition table contains only one value of 1.0 and all other transitions have
a probability of 0.0), turning our hidden Markov gates into classical logic gates. In or-
der to apply an evolutionary algorithm, each HMG is encoded in a similar way as the
NGs using a genome that specifies the network as a whole. Each locus of the genome
is an integer variable ∈ [0, 255]. Following a start codon (marking the beginning of a
gene, where each gene encodes a single HMG), the next two loci encode the number of
inputs and outputs of the gate respectively, followed by a specification of the origin of
the inputs, and the identity of the nodes being written to.
For example, for the HMG depicted in Fig. 4, the loci following the start codon
would specify ‘3 inputs’, ‘2 outputs’, ’read from 1,2,3’, ‘write to 3,4’. This information
is then followed by an encoding of the 2n+m probabilities of an n-input and m-output
state transition table (see Supplementary Fig. S1 in Edlund et al. 2011 for more details.)
For the example given in Fig. 4, the particular HMG is specified by a circular genome
with 39 loci (not counting the start). The start codon is universally (but arbitrarily) cho-
sen as the consecutive loci (42,213). Because this combination only occurs by chance
once every 65,536 pairs of loci (making start codons rare), we insert four start codons at
arbitrary positions into a 5,000 loci initial genome to jump start evolution. Thus, the an-
cestral genomes of all experiments with Markov brains encode at least 4 HMGs. A set
of HMGs encoded in this manner uniquely specifies the Markov brain. The encoding
is robust in the sense that mutations that change the input-output structure of an HMG
leave the probability table intact, while either adding or removing parts of the table.
This flexibility also implies that there is considerable neutrality in the genome, as each
gene has 256 loci reserved for the probability table even if many fewer loci are used.
MBs and ANNs differ with respect to the gates connecting the nodes in each net-
work. ANNs use weights, sums, and a tanh function together with continuous vari-
ables to compute their actions. In contrast MBs use discrete states and boolean logic
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to perform their computation. Using a very similar encoding of the topology means
that mutations will have a similar effect on the topology of both systems, but different
effects on the computations each system performs.
...0110100110... ....010100100.....
...0100110001...
p00 p01 p02 p03
p10 p11 p12 p13
p20 p21 p22 p23
p30 p31 p32 p33
p41 p42 p43p40
p50
p60
p70
p51
p61
p71
p52 p53
p62
p72
p63
p73
3 3
1
2
4
A B
1 2
3
4
Figure 4: A: A single HMG with three inputs and two outputs reads from nodes 1, 2,
and 3, and writes to nodes 3 and 4, updating the states of these nodes in the process.
B: The output states are determined by a set of 23+2 probabilities, here denoted as pxy,
where x and y are the decimal equivalent of the binary pattern of the input and output,
respectively. For example, p73 is the probability for the pattern ‘11’ to fire if the input
was ‘111’, that is, P (11|111) = p73.
2.4 Evolutionary Algorithm
We evolve the two types of networks (ANNs and MBs) using a Genetic Algorithm
(GA). A GA can find solutions to problems by using evolutionary search [see, e.g.,
Michalewicz (1996)]. The GA operates on the specific genetic encoding of the net-
works’ structure (the genotype), by iterating through a cycle of assessing each network’s
fitness in a population of 100 candidates, selecting the successful ones for differential
replication, and finally mutating the new candidate pool. When testing a network’s
performance in controlling the agent, each network is faced with all 80 possible initial
conditions that the world can take on. The fitness w is calculated as the fraction of
successful actions (the number of large blocks avoided plus the number of small blocks
caught) out of 80 tests (a number between zero and 1). For the purpose of selection,
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we use an exponential fitness measure that multiplies the score by a factor 1.1 for ev-
ery successful action, but divides the score by 1.1 for every unsuccessful action, or
S = 1.180(2w−1). After the fitness assessment, the genotypes are ranked according to
S and placed into the next generation with a probability that is proportional to the fit-
ness (roulette wheel selection without elite). After replication, genotypes are mutated.
We implemented three different mutational mechanisms that all occur after replication,
with different probabiities. A point mutation happens with a probability of µ = 0.005
per locus, and causes the value at that locus to be replaced by a uniform random num-
ber drawn from the interval [0 · · · 255]. There is a 2% chance that we delete a sequence
of adjacent loci ranging from 256-512 in size, and a 5% chance that a stretch of 256-
512 adjacent loci is duplicated (the size of the sequence to be deleted or duplicated is
unformly distributed in the range given). The duplicated stretch is randomly inserted
between any two loci in the genome. Duplications and deletions are contrained so that
the genome is not allowed to shrink below 1024 sites, and genomes cannot grow beyond
20,000 sites. Because insertions are more likely than deletions, there is a tendency for
genomes to grow in size during evolution.
We evolve networks through 10,000 generations, and run 200 replicates of each ex-
periment. Note that the type of gates is different between ANNs (neuronal) and MBs
(logic), so the rate of evolution of the two networks cannot be compared directly, be-
cause mutations will have vastly different effects with respect to the function of the
gates. Thus, the optimal mutation rate differs among networks (Orr, 2000). At the end
of each evolutionary run, we reconstruct the evolutionary line of descent (Lenski et al.,
2003) of the experiment, by following the lineage of the most successful agent at the
end of 10,000 generations backwards all the way to the random ancestor that was used
to seed the experiment. This is possible because we do not use cross-over between
genotypes in our GA. This line of descent, given by a temporally ordered sequence of
genotypes, recapitulates the unfolding of the evolutionary process, mutation by muta-
tion, from ancestor to the evolved agent with high fitness, and captures the essence of
that particular evolutionary history. For each of the organisms on each of the 200 lines
of descent of any particular experiment, we calculate a number of information-theoretic
quantities, among which is how much of the world the agent represents in its brain,
using Equation (5).
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2.5 Extracting probabilities from behavior
The inputs to the information-theoretic measure of representationR are the probabilities
to observe a particular state x, p(x), as well as the joint probabilities p(x, y) describing
the probability to observe a state x when at the same time another variable Y takes
on the state Y = y. For the representation R defined by Eq. (5), sensor, internal,
and environment variables are distinguished. For any particular organism (an agent
that performs the ACP task with an evolved controller), R is measured at any point
during the evolution by placing the organism into the simulated world and concurrently
recording time series data of the states of all 16 controller nodes and the states of the
environment. The recordings are then used to calculate the frequency of states. Based
on the frequencies of states, all probabilities relevant for the information-theoretical
quantities can be calculated, including those that take into account the temporal order of
events (for example, the probability p(xt, yt+1) that variable Xt takes on state xt while
variable Yt+1 takes on the state yt+1). If a particular state (or combination of states)
never occurs, a probability of zero is recorded for that entry (even though in principle
the state or combination of states could occur). R (and the other information-theoretic
quantities introduced in section 3) is calculated for organisms on the evolutionary line
of descent making it possible to follow the evolutionary trajectory of R from random
ancestor to adapted agent. For ANNs that have internal nodes with continuous rather
than binary states, a mapping of intervals [−1, 0] → 0 and ]0, 1] → 1 is applied before
calculation of probabilities.
3 Results
To establish a baseline, 100,000 random controllers for each of the two network types
were created and the distributions of R and fitness values were obtained. This baseline
served two purposes: it shows how well randomly generated (unevolved) networks per-
form, and how much information about the world they represent by chance as well as
providing information about the distribution of these values. Random ANNs and MBs
were created in the same way by randomly drawing values from a uniform probability
distribution of the integers ∈ [0, 255] for each of the genome’s loci. Each genome was
then sprinkled with 4 start codons at arbitrary positions within the genome.
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Fig. 5A shows the distribution of fitness scores w for 100,000 random ANNs, and
Fig. 5B shows the distribution of their representationR. The respecitve distributions for
MBs are shown in Fig. 5C for fitness scores and in Fig. 5D for representation. While
both systems use different types of gates, ANNs and MBs do not differ with respect
to their initial fitness or representation distributions. This shows that random genomes
with a high fitness are–as expected–very rare, and need to evolve their functionality in
order to perform optimally.
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Figure 5: Probability distribution of fitnesses and representation scores of random
machines. A: Probability distribution of fitnesses (fraction of successful actions)
p(w)dw = P (w < W < w + dw) for 100,000 random ANNs (dw = 1/80) B:
Probability distribution of the representation variable R for the same random ANNs
p(r)dr = P (r < R < r+ dr), with dr = 0.02. C: Distribution of fitnesses for 100,000
random Markov brains (dw = 1/80). D: Distribution of representation R in the same
MB networks (dr = 0.02).
In order to compare the two network architectures, the evolutionary trajectories for
fitness and representation were analyzed for the evolutionary line of descent (LOD)
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as described in section 2.4. The different LODs obtained from following back any
other member of the final population quickly coalesce to a single line. Hence, the
LOD effectively recapitulates the genetic changes that led from random networks to
proficient ones. The development of fitness and representation over evolutionary time in
Fig. 6 is averaged over 200 independent replicates. While both ANNs and MBs have on
average low fitness at the begin of an evolutionary run (as seen in Fig. 5), MBs become
significantly more fit than ANNs, and after 10,000 generations we find that in 18 out of
200 runs MBs have evolved to perfect fitness, while none of the ANNs reached this level
(the best ANNs correctly make 77 out of 80 decisions). At the same time, we see that
the fitness of the ANNs after 10,000 generations is not stagnating, which suggests that
more runtime will allow for further improvement. As previously mentioned, the rate at
which fitness is achieved in evolutionary time cannot be compared across architectures
because mutations affect the function of the gates differently. While we tentatively
explain the difference in performance between ANNs and MBs by their difference in
representing the world below, we anticipate that the different network architectures also
solve the categorization task very differently. To understand the information dynamics
and the strategies employed in more detail, we measured a number of other information-
theoretic measures (besides R) (see sections below).
The evolutionary trajectory for representation R (see Fig. 6B) is similar to the evo-
lution of fitness (see Fig. 6A), but MBs evolve to a significantly higher value of R. We
attribute this difference to the difference in fitness between the two types of networks,
as the discretization of the continuous ANN variables cannot introduce a bias in R.
Thus, it appears that an increased representation of the world within an agent’s network
controller correlates with fitness. We can test this correlation between fitness and rep-
resentation at the end of a run for the 200 replicates of MBs and ANNs, and find that
fitness and R are significantly correlated (Spearman’s r = 0.55, P = 2.5 × 10−17) for
MBs, but not for ANNs (r = −0.10, P = 0.15). We speculate that because ANNs are
forced to compute using a sigmoid function only (effectively implementing a multiple-
AND gate) while MBs can use arbitrary logic operations to process data, ANNs struggle
to internalize (that is, represent) environmental states. In other words, it appears that
the ease of memory-formation is crucial in forming representations, which are then
efficiently transformed into fit decisions in MBs (Edlund et al., 2011).
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Figure 6: A: Fitness w and B: representation R (in bits) along the line of descent as a
function of evolutionary generations, averaged over 200 independent evolutionary lines,
for evolved networks (ANNs: black, MBs: blue)
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3.1 Analysis of Network Structures and Strategies
In order to be successful at the task described, an agent has to perform active categorical
perception followed by prediction. In the implementation of the ACP task by Beer
(1996; 2003), prediction can be achieved without memory, because once the network
has entered the attractor representing a category, the prediction (to move away or to
stay) can be directly coupled to the attractor. The task used here can only be achieved
using memory (data not shown) and requires the agent to perform categorical perception
by comparing sensory inputs from at least two different time points (which also allows
a prediction of where the object is going to land).
In order to analyze how information is processed, we calculated the predictive in-
formation (Bialek et al., 2001) of the evolved networks, given by the mutual Shannon
information between the network’s inputs at time t and its outputs at time t+ 1. Predic-
tive information, defined this way (Ay et al., 2008), measures how much of the entropy
of outputs (the firings of motor neurons that control the agent) can be understood in
terms of the signals that have appeared in the agent’s sensors just prior to the action.
Indirectly, predictive information therefore also indicates the contribution of the hidden
nodes of the network. A high predictive information would show that the hidden nodes
do not contribute much and that computations are performed mainly by input and output
neurons. Using the variable S for sensor states and A for actuator states, the predictive
information can be written in terms of the shared entropy between sensor states at time
t and motor states at time t+ 1 as
Ipred = I(St : At+1) = −
∑
st,at+1
p(st, at+1) log
p(st, at+1)
p(st)p(at+1)
, (15)
where p(st) = P (St = st) is the probability to observe variable St in state st, p(at+1) =
P (At+1 = at+1) is the probability observe variable At+1 in state at+1, etc. Note that St
and At+1 are joint random variables created from the variables of each node, implying
that St can take on 16 different states while At+1 can take on 4 possible states. The
probabilities are extracted from time series data as described in section 2.5. Figure
7A shows that over the course of evolution, the predictive information Ipred decreases
for MBs after an initial increase, but increases slightly overall for ANNs. The drop in
predictive information for the MBs indicates that their actions become less dependent
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Figure 7: Different measures of information processing and integration along the LOD
for both types of network architectures: ANNs (black) and Markov brains (blue). A:
Predictive information, Eq. (15). B: Unpredicted entropy [Eq. (16)] of the network’s
motor variables. C: Information integration SIatom based on Eq. (17).
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on sensor inputs and are driven more by the hidden neurons, while the ANNs actions
remain to be predictable by sensor inputs.
To test whether it is the internal states that increasingly guide the agent, the predic-
tive information was subtracted from the entropy of the output states (maximally two
bits) to calculate the unpredicted entropy of the outputs, i.e., how much of the motor
outputs are uncorrelated to signals from the input:
Hunpred = H(At+1)− Ipred = H(At+1|St) . (16)
Figure 7B shows that Hunpred increases over the course of evolution, suggesting
that indeed signals other than the sensor readings are guiding the motors. In principle,
this increase could be due to an increase in the motor neuron entropy, however, as the
latter stays fairly constant we can conclude that the more a network adapts to its envi-
ronment, the less its outputs are determined by its inputs and the more by its internal
states. Again, this effect is stronger for MBs than for ANNs, and suggests that it is
indeed the internal states that encode representations that drive the network’s behav-
ior. It is also possible that the motors evolve to react to sensor signals further back in
time. Because sensor neurons cannot store information, such a delayed response also
has to be processed via internal states. While the absolute value of the predicted infor-
mation and unpredicted entropy can depend on this time delay, we expect the overall
trend of a decreasing Ipred coupled with an increasing Hunpred to be the same as for the
one-step predictive information, because the sensorial signal stream itself has temporal
correlations, that is, it is non-random.
To quantify the synergy of the network we calculated a measure of information
integration called synergistic information. Roughly speaking, synergistic information
measures the amount of information that is processed by the network as a whole that
cannot be understood in terms of the information-processing of each individual node,
i.e., it measures the extent to which the whole network is–informationally–more than
the sum of its parts (Edlund et al., 2011):
SIatom = I(Xt : Xt+1)−
n∑
i=1
I(X it : X
i
t+1) . (17)
In Eq. (17), I(Xt : Xt+1) measures the amount of information that is processed (across
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time) by the whole network X (the joint random variable composed of each of the node
variables), whereas I(X it : X
i
t+1) measures how much is processed by node i. The
negative of Eq. (17) has been used before, to quantify the redundancy of information
processing in a neural network (Atick, 1992; Nadal and Parga, 1994; Schneidman et al.,
2003). SIatom is a special case of the information integration measure Φ (Tononi, 2008;
Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008), which is computationally far more complex than SIatom
because it relies on computing information integration across all possible partitions of
a network. SIatom, instead, calculates information integration across the “atomic” par-
tition only, that is, the partition where each node is its own part. Figure 7C shows that
SIatom increases for Markov brains as well as for ANNs, which indicates that both ar-
chitectures evolve the ability to integrate information to perform the task at hand. We
only see a marginal difference between MBs and ANNs in their ability to integrate
information, while at the same time MBs are more dependent on internal states and ul-
timately perform better. This suggests that measuring integrated information in terms of
Eq. 17 does not allow inferences about a system’s capacity do memorize. In summary,
we observe that MBs evolve to become less dependent on sensorial inputs than ANNs,
and in addition, the actions of the MBs become more dependent on internal states than
in ANNs. Thus, we conclude that the network properties that R measures are indeed
representations that the networks create as an adaptive strategy. But how do the net-
works represent their environments? Which features of the world are represented and
form the successful task-solving strategies?
3.1 Epistemically Opaque Strategies
In order to analyze a Markov brain’s function, a number of different tools are available.
First, a causal diagram can be generated by drawing an edge between any two neurons
that are connected via an HMG. The edges are directed, but note that each edge can
in principal perform a different computation. When creating the causal diagram, nodes
that are never written into by any other nodes are removed, as they are computationally
inert (they remain in their default ‘off’ state). Such nodes can also be identified via a
“knock-out” procedure, where the input of each node is forced to either the “0” or “1”
state individually. If such a procedure has no effect on fitness, the node is inert.
Fig. 8 shows the causal diagram of an evolved Markov brain that solves the clas-
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Figure 8: Causal diagram of a Markov brain with perfect fitness, correctly catching all
small blocks and avoiding all large ones. Nodes colored in red are sensors, while motor
variables are green. Double arrows represent two causal connections, one each way.
Nodes with arrows that point to themselves write their output back into their input,
and may work as memory (all nodes return to a default “0” if not set otherwise by
each update), so state information can only be maintained via such self-connections).
Internal nodes can read from motors, giving rise to proprioception, or more precisely,
kinesthesia: the ability to sense one’s own motion. The motors themselves can be used
as memory.
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sification task perfectly. One can see that this network uses inputs from the sensors,
motors, and memory simultaneously for decisions, fusing the different modalities intel-
ligently (Murphy, 1996).
The causal diagram by itself, however, does not reveal how function is achieved in
this network. As each HMG in the present instantiation represents a deterministic logic
gate (generally they are stochastic), it is possible to determine the logical rules by which
the network transitions from state to state by feeding the state-to-state transition table
into a logical analyzer (Rickmann, 2011). The analyzer converts the state transition
table into the minimal description of functions in Boolean logic using only NOT, AND
(∧), and OR (∨). With these functions we can exactly describe each node’s logical
influence on other nodes (and possibly itself). For the network depicted in Fig. 8, the
logic is given by (here, the numeral represents the node, and its index the state at time
t0 or the subsequent time point t1, while an overbar stands for NOT)
4t1 = (2t0 ∧ 5t0) ∨ (2t0 ∧ 6t0)
5t1 = (2t0 ∧ 10t0 ∧ 12t0) ∨ (10t0 ∧ 12t0 ∧ 14t0) ∨ (2t0 ∧ 10t0 ∧ 12t0 ∧ 14t0)
6t1 = 4t0 ∧ (0t0 ∨ 6t0)
7t1 = (2t0 ∧ 12t0) ∨ (10t0 ∧ 12t0 ∧ 14t0)
10t1 = (2t0 ∧ 6t0) ∨ (2t0 ∧ 10t0 ∧ 14t0) ∨ (10t0 ∧ 12t0 ∧ 14t0) ∨ (2t0 ∧ 14t0)
∨(3t0 ∧ 7t0 ∧ 10t0 ∧ 12t0 ∧ 14t0)
12t1 = (1t0 ∧ 7t0) ∨ (3t0 ∧ 7t0) ∨ (3t0 ∧ 7t0)
14t1 = (2t0 ∧ 10t0 ∧ 14t0) ∨ (2t0 ∧ 10t0 ∧ 12t0) ∨ (2t0 ∧ 10t0 ∧ 12t0)
15t1 = (3t0 ∧ 7t0) ∨ (0t0 ∧ 6t0) ∨ (4t0 ∧ 6t0) ∨ (0t0 ∧ 4t0 ∧ 6t0) .
Note that while this logical representation of the network’s dynamics is optimized (and
the contribution of inert nodes is removed), it is in general not possible to determine the
minimal logic network based on state-to-state transition information only, as finding the
minimal logic is believed to be a computationally intractable problem (Kabanets and
Cai, 2000). As a consequence, while it is possible to capture the network’s function in
terms of a set of logical rules, we should not be surprised that evolution delivers epis-
temically opaque designs (Humphreys, 2009), that is, designs that we do not understand
on a fundamental level. However, the strength of measuring representations with R is
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that our measure is able to capture representations even if they are highly distributed
and take part in complex computations. As such, R provides a valuable tool to analyze
evolved neural networks as can be seen below.
0
 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
     
R h
i t
node 4
 
 
 
 
 
     
node 5
 
 
 
 
 
     
node 6
 
 
 
 
 
     
node 7
 
 
 
 
 
     
node 10
 
 
 
 
 
     
node 12
0
 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
     
R L
R
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
0
 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
     
R +
/ -
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
     
0
 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 2 4 6 8
R 4
/ 2
gener. [103]
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
gener. [103]
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
gener. [103]
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
gener. [103]
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
gener. [103]
 
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8
gener. [103]
Figure 9: Representation of each of the 4 environmental properties (concepts) defined
in Eqs. (10-13) as a function of time, within each of the nodes of a network that evolved
to become the one depicted in Fig. 8. Representation is measured in bits, along the
temporal (genetic) line of descent (measured in generations).
3.2 Concepts and Memory
To understand what representations are acquired (representations about which con-
cepts), we calculated R for each property of the environment defined in Eq. (10-13),
within each of the key nodes in our example network shown in Fig. 8. For this network,
Fig. 9 shows that some nodes prefer to represent given single features or concepts, while
others represent several features at the same time. In addition, the degree to which a
node represents a certain property changes during the course of evolution. Looking at
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representation within each individual node, however, only tells part of the story as it
is clear that representations are generally “smeared” over several nodes. If this is the
case, a pair of nodes (for example) can represent more about a feature than the sum of
the representations in each node, i.e., variables can represent synergistically. In order to
discover which combination of nodes represents which feature most accurately, a search
over all partitions of the network would have to be performed, much like in the search
for the partition with minimum information processing in the calculation of a network’s
synergistic information processing (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008).
One can also ask whether brain states represent the environment as it is at the time
it is being represented, or whether it represents the environment in its past state, or
in other words, we can ask whether representations are about more distant or more
proximal events. To answer this, we define temporal representations by including the
temporal index of the Markov variables. For example, a representation at the same time
point t is defined [as implicit in Eq. (5)] as
Rt = H(Et : Mt|St) , (18)
while a representation of events one update prior is defined as
Rt−1 = H(Et−1 : Mt|St) , (19)
i.e., the shared entropy between the internal variables at time t and the environmental
states at time t−1, given the sensor’s states at time t. Naturally, one can define temporal
representations about more distant events in the same manner. Rt, Rt−1, and Rt−2 were
calculated and averaged over all 80 experiments in each generation (for both ANNs and
MBs) over the course of evolution. Figure 10 shows that in both systems Rt−1 is larger
than Rt, and Rt−2 is larger still (but note that Rt−3 is smaller, data not shown), and all
values increase over evolutionary time similar toR (see Fig. 6B). This suggest that both
networks evolve a form of memory that reaches further back than just one update.
We suggest that the peak in representation at a time difference of two updates im-
plied by Fig. 10 can be explained by the hierarchical structure of the networks, which
have to process the sensorial information through at least two time steps to reach a de-
cision (it takes at least two time steps in order to assess the direction of motion of the
block). Decisions have to be made shortly thereafter, however, in order to move the
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Figure 10: Representation as a function of evolutionary time, for three different time
intervals. A: Representation in ANNs (red: Rt, green: Rt−1, blue: Rt−2. B: Represen-
tation in Markov brains (colors as in A). The red curves are the same as in Fig. 6B, and
are shown here for the purpose of comparison.
agent to the correct location in time. This further strengthens our view that represen-
tations are evolved, and furthermore that they build up during an agent’s lifetime as
memory of past events shape the agent’s decisions.
4 Conclusions
We defined a quantitative measure of representation R in terms of information theory,
as the shared entropy between the states of the environment and internal “brain” states,
given the states of the sensors. While internal states are necessary in order to encode
internal models, not all internal states are representations. Indeed, representational in-
formation (which is about the environment) is a subset of the information stored in
internal states. Information about the state of other past internal states or sub-states do
not count towards R, and neither would information about imagined worlds, for exam-
ple. Testing which nodes of the system contain representations about what aspect of
the environment helps us to distinguish between information present in internal states
and information that is specifically used as a representation. We applied this measure
to two types of networks that were evolved to control a simulated agent in an active
categorical peception task. Our experiments showed that the achieved R increases with
fitness during evolution independently of the system used. We also showed that while
30
the (algorithmic) function of both artificial neural networks and Markov networks is dif-
ficult to understand, deterministic Markov networks can be reduced to sets of Boolean
logic functions. This logic, however, may be epistemically opaque. While representa-
tion R increases in networks over evolutionary time, each neuron can represent parts
of individual concepts (features of the environment). However, most often concepts are
distributed over several neurons and represent synergistically. In addition, representa-
tions also form over the lifetime of the agent, increasing as the agent integrates infor-
mation about the different concepts to reach a decision. Thus, what evolves in Markov
and artificial neural networks via Darwinian processes are not the representations them-
selves, but rather what evolves is the capacity to represent the environment, while the
representations themselves are formed as the agent observes and interacts with the envi-
ronment. We argued that R can be measured in continuous (artificial neural networks)
as well as discrete systems (Markov networks), which suggests that this measure can be
used in more complex and more natural systems. We found that in the implementation
used here, Markov networks were able to evolve their ability to form representations
more easily than artificial neural networks. Future investigations will show what kind
of system is more powerful to make intelligent decisions using representations.
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